Some people were wondering what place virtues like “loyalty,” etc., would have in the Objectivist ethics. Below is the best I could draw up into how minor or less fundamental virtues may take place in the Objectivist ethics. You will notice that they are derivatives of the more fundamental virtues, as I put six fundamental virtues as ultimately derivatives of the cardinal virtue of rationality. As well, the minor virtues I placed are often derived by more than one fundamental virtue. I did this because I found it difficult to make the minor virtues be subsumed under only one fundamental virtue, and I thought it appropriate that they would be derived by more than one, as per the integrated and well-interlocked nature of reality.
I assume that much of what people perceive when they decide to look into the world are particulars, and this goes with virtues. In such a case, a person doesn’t readily see someone using reason; they readily see someone being just or courageous. Where when we reflect or attempt to understand the particulars, we actually start discovering more fundamental or broad patterns. So, a fundamental methodology underlies the particular goods we observe. A man is glorious, loyal, honorable, and first-handed. We may ask how this is so. According to this theory, it’s that there’s a more fundamental trait that he pays heed to that underlies all of the others, e.g. reason. Or, a man is courageous, loyal, stalwart, and honorable, and we say he has great integrity.
Changes readily present themselves when I review the diagram. “Charity,” for example, being replaced by something more like “caring” or “kindness,” as in the ready lending of help or pleasantness. “First-handedness” being replaced by something like “self-truth” or “internal-truthfulness,” but I think I made a fair choice in their stead, as is the case with charity.